

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

In Darfur all aspects of the conflict and peoples livelihoods are inextricably linked. The study has shown how livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict, the impact of the conflict and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict. Similarly, the two greatest immediate challenges to protecting and supporting livelihoods in Darfur are first insecurity, and second the outstanding grievances – including loss of lives, sexual violence and loss of livelihood - particularly the major losses of livestock. Thus moves to find a peaceful solution must take account of livelihoods, while efforts to support livelihoods must consider the political economy of conflict and implications for livelihoods and livelihood interventions.

The long established symbiosis between herder and farmer has been eroded in recent decades as people's livelihoods have converged thus shifting the moral geography of herder and farmer and bringing them into conflict. Declining rainfall and processes of desertification have contributed to north south migration, which combined with increasing population pressure has created more direct competition over access to natural resources. Meanwhile the traditional systems of native administration and land tenure that are intended to manage and protect these common law rights have been eroded and in part replaced by the individual drive for profits.

These local pressures must be seen in the wider national and regional context, which has contributed to marginalization of Darfur, the development and arming of militia groups, and the supply of arms generally. Actions on the part of the Government of Sudan and the opposition movements have had a crippling affect on livelihoods, including hindering trade, access to markets, labour migration and the flow of remittances.

The short and medium-term outlook for livelihoods is bleak indeed. For those IDPs who are receiving humanitarian assistance their survival (but not their livelihood) is assured as long as the humanitarian aid continues to flow, which makes this type of humanitarian assistance a priority.

But for those who remain in rural areas their livelihood is seriously threatened. Never in the history of Darfur has there been such a combination of factors causing the failure of livelihood strategies, including:

- production failures,
- market failures,
- failures to access natural resources, and
- failure to transmit back remittances.

Under these circumstances regionwide famine is inevitable. While food aid can partially redress the production failures, a much wider raft of interventions are needed to begin to address the other failures.

Major structural changes need to be addressed at the international, national and state level. These changes include processes of land restitution and compensation; livestock restitution, reconciliation and compensation; and opening up of transport routes to provide safe passage of people, livestock and goods. Ideally these wider processes of reconciliation should be linked with livelihood support and development inputs, particularly education, which is probably one of the most sorely missed of public services. However while the conflict continues to rage it is these major structural changes that require the commitment and support of all levels of administration that will have most impact on livelihoods.

Livelihoods programming will not be easy or straightforward in the context of Darfur. Since livelihoods are so integral to the conflict and war economy, it is imperative that implementing agencies understand and consider fully the implications of livelihood interventions in the dynamics of conflict. Any peace-building or conflict resolution must also understand, take account of and be linked with livelihoods.

The international humanitarian response will be long-term and the question arises as to how this can be used to support livelihoods as well as save lives. There are several points to make in relation to this issue. First, provision of humanitarian assistance to save lives must be continued. Second, there are very limited opportunities to support the livelihoods of IDPs because livelihood strategies are rurally based and depend on access to natural and physical resources. Third, certain livelihood interventions in IDP camps could serve as a 'pull factor' to other rural dwellers, or contribute to further polarization since access to these interventions is likely to be unequal.

Solving the livestock issues are central to finding lasting solutions to the problems in Darfur. Darfur's economy has been seriously eroded and the traditional backbone of the economy – livestock trade, is failing fast. Given the wide-ranging interests in livestock production and trade among all tribal groups, government and opposition groups, it is highly likely that very soon this trade will be under the direction and control of an alternative 'war economy' with a vested interest in sustaining conflict and controlling the relatively lucrative livestock trade.

The primary interest of those who have lost their livestock through looting is to get their livestock back. They insist on being compensated by the Government. No one is certain when and how this will happen. Restocking through donor funding could be problematic for four reasons. First, the scale of the restocking programme will be unprecedented covering over 250,000 households each requiring a foundation stock of some 20 shoats. Funding and capacity may not be available on this scale. Second, donors sponsored restocking sends the wrong signal to the perpetrators and during restocking there is a danger that stolen animals could be purchased and distributed to their rightful owners, thereby rewarding those who looted them. This may also encourage further looting. Third, an externally funded process of restocking would not allow for reconciliation processes between the parties to occur through resolution of the livestock issue. Fourth, replenishing looted and lost assets will not solve the issue of mobility and safe access to trade and migration routes which are an essential part of the livestock livelihood system for all groups. Until free and unhindered access and mobility can be achieved, rural livelihoods in Darfur will remain under siege.

Recommendations

Recommendations are made relating to six broad areas:

- Security, stabilization and governance
- Land
- Livestock
- Markets
- Labour migration, communications and remittances
- International humanitarian response

All of these are considered immediate priorities, but clearly the time needed to achieve these goals varies.

Security, stabilization and local governance

1. Peace and security were the universal goal of all those interviewed. Humanitarian access and the current very limited security of humanitarian interventions is not enough. Security must be extended to all aspects of daily life and livelihoods, including livelihood strategies, mobility, markets, and protection of assets. These expanded aspects of security must be incorporated within the expanded mission of the African Union in Darfur.
2. The study recognizes the overriding importance of reaching a political solution to the conflict through the international processes of conflict resolution at Abuja. Any settlement must address the underlying marginalization.
3. There are two ways in which the Naivasha process can provide a framework for Darfur:
 - a. A model for the negotiating process between GoS and rebel groups in Sudan
 - b. Applying and adapting the contents of the protocols as quickly as possible in Darfur. In particular there are elements of the protocols where there are additional provisions for the transition areas that could be adapted.
4. The north south peace and its protocols are not a panacea for peace in Darfur. It remains unclear how the protocols are going to be implemented once the peace has been signed. Also there are important elements missing from the protocols which are critical elements for the resolution of the Darfur crisis. For example the protocols do not outline in detail how they are to be applied at the level below the state. Also, the role of the native administration and its relationship to local government is not articulated. In the context of Darfur these issues must be addressed.
5. All groups must be aware and understand the protocols within Darfur for all groups including native administration, civil society groups, citizens (including IDPs) and international actors. This will require awareness-raising.
6. While the Abuja talks address conflict resolution at the national and international level, the tribal leadership and relevant sections of civil society are needed to address local level conflict resolution and compensation and support the decisions taken at Abuja. There is a critical need to understand and learn lessons from the failures of past reconciliation conferences, including the role of central government. This nuanced understanding is

important for the international community, who might also have a role to play in these processes.

7. The international level talks should recognize and seek to enhance the function of the tribal leadership, while understanding the fragile and limited capacity of the Native Administration in many areas. It is also important to recognize that the Native Administration is not free from the political influence of the central government, and that it has its own political agenda. For this reason it is essential that its functions are de-politicized, clearly articulated, locally specific, authorized by local governing authorities (rebel or GoS), and locally agreed to by all groups.
8. Local governance in Darfur is not uniform, and there is an urgent need to learn lessons from different local approaches to reconciliation and security. This report has identified some localised conflict resolution initiatives, together with examples of good local governance, which are likely to have wider resonance. For example,
 - Local level dialogue is currently ongoing between the Zayadia (Arab) and the Meidob in north east Darfur regarding disputes over access to pastures and boundaries. The Kawahla from western Kordofan are mediating this process. State government has tried to halt this process, but this was resisted by the negotiating parties. Local level dialogues should be encouraged and allowed to proceed unhindered.
 - The Beni Hussein have strong local governance (see page 7) including local security arrangements. Groups like the Beni Hussein who have endeavored to insulate themselves from the conflict are struggling to maintain this stance. These efforts must be better understood and supported where appropriate and possible.
9. Although the study did not explicitly consider violence against women, it was frequently encountered, with women putting themselves at risk for their livelihoods (eg gathering firewood, going to market) which raises issues of how this should be addressed along with the potential co-epidemic of HIV/AIDS. At the very least the local capacities to deal with these two co-epidemics needs to be assessed with a view to identifying local networks and institutions through which interventions may be directed. The issue of compensation must be addressed and included in local compensation and restitution processes (traditionally known as the *judiya*).

Land Commission

10. The study recommends the appointment of a Land Commission covering all three States of Darfur, with representation from relevant parties. This action is in line with the Protocol on Southern Kordofan/Blue Nile. The Land Commission should be responsible for:
 - Mapping of the existing *hakuras* and *mass'arat* (livestock migration routes) through local consultation and based on local agreement within all strata of the Native Administration. The mapping work on livestock migration routes should be conducted in close association with the Livestock Reconciliation and Compensation Commission (LRCC).
 - Administration of the land tenure based on traditional systems.

- Ensuring that all groups, including minority groups, are consulted even where they may no longer be represented in their original home area. This includes Arab and non Arab Groups, who have migrated as a result of the conflict but not necessarily classed as IDPs.
- Rehabilitation of water points in rural areas, which should be addressed on a case-by-case basis as people return, or for existing rural dwellers i.e. not a blanket rehabilitation strategy.
- Overseeing restitution and compensation over land disputes.

Livestock

Livestock Reconciliation and Compensation

11. The study recommends the creation of a Livestock Reconciliation and Compensation Commission (LRCC), which should cover all three States of Darfur, and all groups within the region. The LRCC should adopt three complementary approaches to reconciliation and compensation:

- Oversee the taxation of sold livestock and ensure that all taxation revenue is used for the LRCC compensation processes to the original owner i.e. use taxation as compensation for those who have had livestock looted, (including the traders who lost camel caravans and had drovers kidnapped by rebel groups).
- Encourage the voluntary return of livestock by providing an amnesty for livestock looting as part of the local reconciliation process.
- Provide certificates of ownership for all certified livestock. Export markets may only accept certified livestock.

12. Livestock taxation revenues should entirely be reserved for this process of restitution and reconciliation, and even raised for the first year to allow the process to go forward.

- a. The Government of Sudan should be seen to be one of the major financial contributors to this process given their failures to protect livestock resources of rural people in Darfur.
- b. The work of the commission will be locally implemented through the Native Administration Council system, which ensures that all relevant groups are represented, plus mutually acceptable neutral third party groups. The Commission should start with pilots at primary and secondary markets, ensuring all livestock species are dealt with.
- c. In addition the markets in Dongola (Sudan) and in Aweinat or Kufra (Libya) should be monitored by Sudanese groups for looted camels and reported to the LRCC.
- d. The closed customs points in Darfur should be re-opened and should be involved in the monitoring for certificates of ownership.
- e. A joint UN/ AU International Monitoring Committee should be created to oversee the processes.

Livestock Migration

13. The opening up of livestock migration routes needs to be addressed at a political level (agreement between local authorities governing different sections of livestock routes) and a

local level – how local arrangements are negotiated. Therefore livestock migration is an important point of negotiation for reconciliation between groups. Conflicts over livestock migration are not only between farmer and herder, but also between herders with similar political leanings e.g. the Zaghawa and Meidob. The opening of livestock migration routes will only come with local peace and reconciliation through the Peace talks and the work of the LRCC and Land Commission. At present different groups control different sections of the migration routes. The SLM currently controls the wet season reserves in the north, while the dry season reserves are controlled by Arabs in the south. There needs to be recognition of grazing rights of pastoralists for both the wet and dry season with similar provision to the Abyei Protocol.

Livestock Health and Feed

14. Sudan has well developed veterinary services and therefore any interventions must be coordinated, managed and implemented through the veterinary department at Federal and State level.
15. There is a shortage of veterinary drug supplies either through the government or private sector. The Government of Sudan should make supplies available through the veterinary services. Regular vaccination programmes must be carried out especially where livestock are in confined areas and unable to access the usual livestock migration routes.
16. There is a high risk of an outbreak of PPR (Peste Petitis de Ruminis) among camels in Darfur, as the Soba Veterinary Department has recently confirmed an outbreak of PPR in Sudan, and conditions in Darfur are conducive. PPR vaccination is therefore a high priority for maintaining camel herds in Darfur. Clearly, this would have to take account of the issue of looted livestock (LRCC) and also reach the camel herds of all groups. Livestock vaccination has provided opportunities for local level conflict resolution in neighbouring countries, which could be explored in Darfur.
17. Review coverage of veterinary services and access to such services in all areas for all groups, with a view to expanding coverage through mobile units or community based animal health workers (CBAW) who get their supplies from their units.
18. The SLM/A should support mobile veterinary services to pass through their areas and provide services. Equally, Arab pastoralists should allow mobile veterinary to pass through and work in their areas.
19. Some IDPs, particularly women and children, are putting themselves at extreme risk to collect fodder for their donkeys and other livestock. This urgently needs to be addressed as a security and protection issue. Distribution of livestock fodder generally for IDPs is considered inappropriate at this time, because few IDPs have livestock (except donkeys) and because the provision of fodder provides market interests in maintaining the position of IDPs. Donkeys are a special case because every rural household in Darfur needs a donkey to go about their daily lives, and they will be an essential part of the return and reintegration process. Where there are large concentrations of donkeys in IDP camps,

feasibility studies should be conducted linked with pilot distributions of concentrates (molasses, sugar cane tops, briquettes) and fodder.

Trade and Markets

Livestock Trade Routes

20. The study recommends the controlled opening of all livestock trade routes, including the opening of the national border between Libya and Sudan, the route to Dongola, and the northern and southern livestock routes to Muweli (Omdurman). This must be agreed by all parties at the international (Abuja), national and local level.
21. The extreme southern route (from south Darfur through Burum) should be discouraged or closed because it is longer and more costly and will reduce the price to the producer. There is also a high prevalence of Tsetse, and large trade herds risk increased transmission of disease and negative impact on the environment (over-grazing).
22. There are a number of related issues that must be taken into account:
 - It is recognized that looted livestock will pass through these routes and therefore there must be controls linked with this (LRCC).
 - Livestock are the primary source of taxation revenues for the Darfur States. Given the present circumstances taxation should be used to the benefit of the Darfurians, in particular as payment towards the Livestock Reconciliation and Compensation Commission.

Markets - Commodity Trade Routes

23. There needs to be agreement at Abuja from all parties to protect the main transport routes to allow safe passage of goods and people and minimize taxation. This protection must not be in contravention of the ceasefire.
24. The African Union should patrol key transport routes. Local security incidents linked with looting along transport routes should be monitored and reported by the African Union.

Free Access To Markets For Buyers & Sellers

25. All restrictions on individuals buying, selling or transporting basic goods must be removed. This includes the GoS permit system in Kutum, which restricts and taxes the purchases of anyone coming to market from outside the town's boundary including the IDP camp. Livestock taxation is a special case and is dealt with above.
26. As the situation stabilizes a number of market interventions may be appropriate including for example,
 - Seeds and tools fairs, where buyers and sellers are brought together.
 - Increase the size of the food basket (general ration) in order to allow for trade and purchase of other essential commodities, especially firewood.
 - Purchasing local seed varieties to protect local species and secure local seed supply for the next cultivation season.
 - Seed multiplication programmes.

- Provision of credits to the small traders whose capital has eroded, particularly those whose caravans have been attacked and looted. Livestock trade with Libya is dominated by traders with small capital compared to those working in livestock trade and exportation to other countries in the Arab world. The support of these traders will have a multiplier effect.

Labour migration, remittances and communications

Communications and tracing

27. To improve communications between the diaspora outside of Darfur and their families in Darfur, which will facilitate the flow of remittances into Darfur, the following immediate steps should be taken:
- i. Mobile networks and landlines in Darfur should be kept open at all times (the networks are frequently closed),
 - ii. Mobile networks should be extended to cover adjacent IDP camps,
 - iii. More landline communication centers should be opened in urban centers hosting IDPs, and in established IDP camps e.g in Kutum and El Fasher.
 - iv. All groups should have access to these centers.
28. Provide mechanisms for migrant worker family tracing, for example, tracing operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be extended to include Darfurians who are located in all parts of Sudan and in the refugee camps in Chad. The Red Crescent in Libya and Sudan to support family tracing and reunification schemes with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross (or vice versa).

Libya

29. The national border between Sudan and Libya should be opened in a careful and controlled manner and with the full involvement and agreement of all parties (including the Libyan authorities, the Government of Sudan, the opposition groups and the native administration of affected tribes in Darfur). Negotiations and agreements on the opening of the border and protection of trade routes will require commitments and actions by the opposition parties to ensure security of access for labour migrants as well as the Government of Sudan. This also relates to the recommendation on trade routes (29, 30).
30. Efforts must be made to discourage all recruitment activity in Libya. Sudanese groups in Libya should be actively supported with training and skills development to equip them for skilled work opportunities in Libya and for their return to Sudan.
31. There are increasing numbers of Sudanese workers in Libya without legal papers and without regular work (in part because of the recent requirement for foreign workers in Libya to pay for a health test and their inability to return because of border closure). This situation combined with the insecurity and lack of opportunity in Darfur puts pressures on workers to seek opportunities to get to Europe. Immediate steps should be taken by the Libyan authorities to grant an amnesty for all Sudanese in Libya without identity papers or a valid health certificate that would allow them the option to return back to Sudan or to take the health test and apply for identity papers and work legally in Libya.

32. End the discriminatory provision of services against labour migrants in Libya, including the discriminatory provision of, food subsidies, health care and education. The health tests for Sudanese migrants should be provided free of charge at least until the Sudan/ Libya border is opened and the security situation stabilized.

Supporting Remittance Flows and Support to migrant workers and IDPs outside Darfur

33. Remittances are potentially a critical source of income for Darfurians, particularly given the collective failure of other sources of income. Remitted cash and goods before the conflict were usually either hand-carried or sent through traders and hawalars. These mechanisms have all but ceased. Every effort must be made to support both remittance flows and employment of migrant workers. The first step is to ensure freedom of movement and an improvement in security of routes and public transport, including bus routes throughout Darfur (see also communications, and security of routes 29, 30, 34, 35, 36).
34. A joint UN/GoS needs assessment of the Darfurian displaced in Khartoum is a priority, followed by activities to address these needs through humanitarian interventions, protection and policy change, as part of the response to the Darfur crisis. In addition to responding to immediate humanitarian needs, the international community should work with local groups to develop livelihood resources and strategies, including education and training opportunities, agricultural skills, access to micro-finance services etc. Activities should be carefully targeted, and should not be on such a grand scale so as to encourage migration from Darfur.

International humanitarian response

35. It is imperative that the international humanitarian community makes all efforts to demonstrate impartiality by reaching out to respond to the needs of all groups. While the difficulties of separating civilians and combatants in rural locations are greater than in the context of refugee camps, it is nevertheless vital that the international community seeks out the views, experiences and attempts to address the needs of all groups in order to prevent further marginalization of Arab groups, in particular. Furthermore, if humanitarian aid fails to reach affected Arab groups this will almost certainly inflame tensions, and could even contribute to reprisals or harassment of humanitarian workers.
36. Humanitarian assessment exercises and interventions should be directed at all groups where possible. It is especially important to include areas and groups that were not previously included, rather than limiting surveys and assessments to groups already receiving assistance.
37. International organizations should be aware of the ethnic distribution of their staff and seek to ensure ethnic representation while remaining sensitive to any specific security concerns. Fielding ethnically representative teams may be impractical and risky from a security point of view. Nevertheless agencies must ensure they consider the potential ethnic biases of their teams.

38. Minimum standards can rarely be achieved at the height of an emergency and pragmatic decisions must be made as to the best strategy to achieve the progressive realization of rights for all affected groups. The strategy among some international groups interviewed was to expand only when minimum standards had been achieved in their current programme, which is a strategy for humanitarian containment not humanitarian action. This strategy may be linked with the plethora of evaluations that are underway, and therefore it may be helpful to review the purposes of these evaluations to ensure they are not contributing to the strategy of 'risk free' programming. (In other words agencies might play safe and keep their programmes small, manageable and risk-free in order to ensure that they will have the best possible evaluation).
39. The study would therefore recommend careful review of standards in order to achieve wider coverage and greater general impact. This does not necessarily mean reducing inputs, rather it may mean simplifying logistics and distribution. In relation to food distribution for example, this might include simplifying the ration (single or dual commodities, instead of a full food basket) or blanket instead of targeted distribution. These decisions would require a cost-benefits analysis and feasibility study.
40. The risks of rape, attack and abduction while IDPs collect firewood represent a serious protection issue, which must be addressed given the critical importance of fuel for cooking. There is obviously a problem with sourcing supplies of firewood, charcoal or briquettes and there is also the issue of sustainability. However, these must not preclude the humanitarian imperative of providing appropriate inputs and protection. This is an opportunity for collaboration between the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, who have plantations and experience, and also agencies like UNHCR who have encountered similar problems among refugees worldwide. The limited work of agencies with fuel efficient stoves and fuel efficient cooking techniques is useful, but needs to be expanded and complemented with other initiatives. This action is also urgently needed to prevent the rapid deforestation that is taking place around towns.
41. While it is recognized that the number of NGOs with experience of working in Darfur are very few, nevertheless the international humanitarian community should visibly demonstrate a better knowledge and understanding of local non Arab and Arab groups, their history, livelihoods and systems of administration and conflict resolution. There is a role for collaboration between the experienced NGOs in Darfur with local educational organizations in relation to providing induction and training for national and international staff working in Darfur. It would be important for experienced Khartoum institutions to work closely with relevant institutions and INGOs in Darfur. This would serve to link local institutions with international organizations for mutual support and capacity development.
42. Conditions are almost certainly going to rapidly deteriorate in Darfur, particularly when the limited benefits of the recent harvest have begun to wear off in early 2005. It is imperative that emergency preparedness starts now. One of the single greatest challenges will be the distribution system, ensuring this is sufficiently decentralized to prevent drought induced distress migration. It will be important to establish regional stockpiles on Darfur borders,

including El Kufra in south east Libya. Systems of distribution that minimize security risks will also be important.

43. Emergency preparedness on Darfur's southern border in northern Bahr el Ghazal is urgently needed, in preparation for a likely influx of displaced people from South Darfur. In recent days there have been reports of arrivals. The implications of distress migration into Bahr el Ghazal on the fragile relations between tribes in Bahr el Ghazal should also be taken into consideration, and their needs considered.

A livelihood strategy for Darfur

44. In preparation for when security conditions improve and mobility is possible, a Livelihoods Task Force should be created under the auspices of the United Nations, the African Union, and reporting to the highest office in central government. The role of this Task Force should be to monitor the conditions affecting livelihoods in Darfur identified in this study, with a view to developing a national strategy for protecting, supporting and rehabilitating livelihoods in Darfur. This strategy should be developed through participatory processes which involve taking government, the UN, AU (and possibly donors) into the field to see local conditions and seek local solutions with civil society and relevant local institutions. A similar process should be organized for the leadership of the opposition groups. The work of the Task Force should be closely linked with ongoing protection work, and should ensure that critical livelihood issues are considered by the relevant political processes.