From the above points, it is evident that we should not assume that the AU can spring into being, as a fully-formed set of institutions, and drive the process of African political and economic integration. Rather, the process of establishing the African Union and the processes of integration should be conducted in parallel. In this respect, our immediate aim should be one of process not of end result. As with the vision of the EU, the constitution of the AU should be to promote ‘ever closer union’. Therefore the final set of concerns we must address are to do with how this process is to work, what checks and balances, what feedback and correction, what monitoring, will be required.
- The role of summits and the council of ministers. Major decisions about the AU architecture and capacities will be made in the existing OAU organs and their successors. The complexity of the issues to be resolved by the summits and council meetings will entail extensive preparation and briefings before these meetings, and perhaps changes in the structure of the meetings so as to allow for technical committees to work in parallel and present their findings and recommendations to the heads of state and ministers.
- Broadening the engagement. Up to now the AU process has been driven almost exclusively by governments. It is necessarily a sovereign process, but the experience of elsewhere indicates that success will depend upon broadening the ownership of the process, so as to engage others more fully. Public dialogue on the AU was initiated at the June 2001 OAU-CSO meeting, which included presentations and a question-and-answer session led by the former Secretary General and senior staff members. At Sirte in 2000 and subsequently at the 2001 Lusaka Summit, Africa’s Heads of State and Government agreed that broader consultation was necessary. This raises the question, how are people to be engaged, sensitised and activated on a regular basis in the process of building the Union? One component of this is the engagement of the media to cover the activities and deliberations of the AU. Another is regular consultative fora, both for general issues (along the lines of the 2001 OAU-CSO meeting, perhaps held annually before the summit) and for specific issues.
- Democratising the process. The Constitutive Act invites parliamentarians to take on a pivotal role in the architecture of the Union. One of the recurrent themes of regional organisations, including the EU, is that they suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’—i.e. that the decision-making process at the regional level is less democratic than at the national level. If the AU were to follow this pattern it would be unfortunate, as some African countries do not score highly in terms of democratic freedoms and decision-making. Given that one of the aims of NEPAD is the promotion of democracy and good governance, it seems appropriate to construct an AU system that provides a ‘democratic surplus’—i.e. the regional institutions and processes are more democratic, transparent and accountable than most national political processes.
- Internationalising the process. Like it or not, the reality of Africa today is that it is integrated into a global order on unequal terms. The viability of African initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU depend critically on the extent to which they are able to obtain buy-in from OECD countries, both in terms of agreement on the basic concepts, and in terms of resource provision.
- Leadership, cooperation and sovereignty. The first section of this paper has underlined that powerful political and economic interests, overriding the concerns of sovereignty, impelled regional integration in Europe and south-east Asia. In Africa, there are equally powerful reasons why sovereignty should be pooled. If Africa speaks with one voice at an international level, it is able to obtain a far better deal on issues of common concern such as the environment, international trade rules and HIV/AIDS drug prices. If African governments unite, they will become individually as well as collectively stronger and more prosperous. However, unlike in Europe and south-east Asia, the political constituencies and economic interests backing integration are relatively weak. This is related to the quality of governance and level of economic development. The most democratic countries on the continent are the most enthusiastic supporters of integration, while the most powerful business interests (South African industry) are already actively promoting it by regionwide investment strategies. These processes need to be boosted. The most important factor in this respect is leadership: Africa needs inspiring, consistent, high-level political leadership that repeatedly emphasises the imperative of unification.
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