

# **The Millennium Development Goals: Towards a Civil Society Perspective on Reframing Poverty Reduction Strategies in Southern Africa**

**Neville Gabriel<sup>1</sup>**

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*Especially since the mid-1990s, Southern African civil society organisations have consistently campaigned against poverty and for policy and governance transformation towards defined social development objectives. The Millennium Development Goals correspond directly with the objectives of civil society organisations that have been active in social and economic justice advocacy work in the region. However, Southern African civil society organisations have either ignored or been slow in taking up the Millennium Development Goals framework in their research, service provision, community organisation, and advocacy work. This has happened because of a lack of information and, in some cases, because the Millennium Development Goals have been seen as a global multilateral government concern in which civil society organisations have not had a stake. Meanwhile, there is increasing coordinated research, education, and advocacy work beginning to happen among Southern African civil society organisations in regard to the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Union. Linking the Millennium Development Goals and civil society concerns about the poverty reduction strategy of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, powerful possibilities exist to integrate the Millennium Development Goals into existing civil society campaigns and processes in the region towards more effective strategies and alliances.*

## **1. Southern Africa's<sup>2</sup> Poverty Complex**

A review of sub-Saharan social development indicators provides a bleak picture of the region's progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Despite Africa's capital flows increasing dramatically to \$20.1 billion in 2001 from \$14.6 billion in 2000, the continent's 2002 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth declined to 2.8% from 3.5% in 2001 and per capita income growth dropped to 0.5% from 1.1% in the same period.<sup>3</sup>

This does not mean that progress towards income poverty reduction has just slowed down. Macro-indicators hide intra-country distortions and do not reflect the organic nature of the poverty complex in the region.<sup>4</sup> The number of people and proportion of sub-Saharan Africa's population living on less than \$1 a day is increasing.<sup>5</sup> There was a net reduction in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2001 due to declines in Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC, and Zambia, despite increases in Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Mozambique.<sup>6</sup>

With the exception of Tanzania, the proportion of the population without access to clean water has increased only marginally. At current rates, it will take sub-Saharan Africa between one hundred and two hundred years to reach nutrition, primary education enrolment, and child survival targets. Meanwhile, HIV/AIDS infections in Southern Africa continue to multiply, with a compounding negative impact on other development objectives.<sup>7</sup>

Drastic declines in primary school enrolment between 1990 and 2000 occurred in Botswana, Namibia, the DRC, and Tanzania, despite remarkable progress in Malawi and progress in Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland, with the ratio of girls to boys declining in Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe and increasing in Malawi, the DRC and Tanzania.<sup>8</sup>

Under-five child mortality rates soared between 1990 and 2001 in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Zambia, with slight improvements in Namibia, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Malawi.<sup>9</sup>

In Angola, a year after the end of civil war, a third of the population depends on humanitarian assistance<sup>10</sup>, with 15 million people throughout Southern Africa requiring food aid in 2002<sup>11</sup>.

Contrary to popular belief, South Africa is not an exception in the region. South African primary school enrolment decreased by more than 10% between 1990 and 2002 and the child mortality rate increased significantly between 1990 and 2001.<sup>12</sup>

The national average life expectancy at birth for Southern Africa's 200 million people<sup>13</sup> is a shocking 42 years.<sup>14</sup>

Despite a political solution to apartheid in South Africa and positive developments in ending the long-standing wars in the region, Southern Africa is locked in a poverty complex that is spiralling downwards.

## Southern Africa: Comparative Development Data from the World Development Indicator Database 2003

|                              | Population | Life Expectancy at Birth | GNI per capita* | Primary education completion | Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education | Child Malnutrition | Under-5 mortality | Prevalence of HIV among women, 15 – 24 years old | Access to improved water source |
|------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|---|--------------------|-------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Unit                         | millions   | years                    | \$              | %                            | %   | %                  | Per 1,000         | %**  | %                               |
| Year                         | 2001       | 2001                     | 2001            | 1995 - 2001                  | 2000  | 1993 - 2001        | 2001              | 2001   | 2000                            |
| <b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>    | <b>674</b> | <b>46</b>                | <b>460</b>      | -                            | -   | -                  | <b>171</b>        | <b>9.20</b>                                      | <b>58</b>                       |
| East Asia & Pacific          | 1,823      | 69                       | 900             | 105                          | -   | 15                 | 44                | <i>0.16</i>                                      | 76                              |
| Europe & Central Asia        | 475        | 69                       | 1,970           | -                            | -   | -                  | 38                | -  | 91                              |
| Latin America & Caribbean    | 524        | 71                       | 3,580           | -                            | 102   | 9                  | 34                | <i>0.30</i>                                      | 86                              |
| Middle East and North Africa | 301        | 68                       | 2,220           | 86                           | 95  | 15                 | 54                | -  | 88                              |
| South Asia                   | 1,378      | 63                       | 450             | 74                           | -   | -                  | 99                | <i>0.48</i>                                      | 84                              |
| Angola                       | 14         | 47                       | 500             | 28                           | -   | 41                 | 260               | 5.75   | 38                              |
| Botswana                     | 2          | 39                       | 3,100           | 102                          | 102   | 13                 | 110               | 37.49  | 95                              |
| DRC                          | 52         | 45                       | 80              | 40                           | -   | 34                 | 205               | 5.91   | 45                              |
| Malawi                       | 11         | 38                       | 160             | 64                           | 94  | 25                 | 183               | 14.89  | 57                              |
| Mozambique                   | 18         | 42                       | 210             | 36                           | 75  | 26                 | 197               | 14.67  | 57                              |
| South Africa                 | 43         | 47                       | 2,820           | 98                           | 100   | 9                  | 71                | 25.64  | 86                              |
| Tanzania                     | 34         | 44                       | 270             | 60                           | 99  | 29                 | 165               | 8.06   | 68                              |
| Zambia                       | 10         | 37                       | 320             | 73                           | 92  | 24                 | 202               | 20.98  | 64                              |
| Zimbabwe                     | 13         | 39                       | 480             | -                            | 94  | 13                 | 123               | 33.01  | 83                              |
| <b>Average / Total</b>       | <b>197</b> | <b>42</b>                | <b>824</b>      | <b>63</b>                    | <b>94</b>   | <b>24</b>          | <b>168</b>        | <b>18.49</b>                                     | <b>66</b>                       |

\* Atlas method, newly adopted by the World Bank. GNI is GDP including a terms of trade adjustment. See [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org) for details of change in statistical terminology. \*\* Average of high and low estimates  
 Primary data source: 2003 World Development Indicators Database, World Bank. See [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)  
 Note: Figures in italics are for periods other than those specified

### 1.1. Food Insecurity

With improved weather conditions in much of the region, the basic food supply situation improved significantly in 2003. The number of people estimated to face starvation dropped from over 15 million to around 6.5 million.<sup>15</sup> However, the underlying causes of vulnerability need to be addressed before the region can say that it is no longer facing a crisis. James Morris, United Nations (UN) Envoy for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa, warned recently that the combination of HIV/AIDS and its impact on agriculture threatens a new type of food crisis.<sup>16</sup>

Food insecurity and poverty fuel the HIV/AIDS pandemic, with hunger forcing people into increasingly high risk behaviour at the same time as lowering resistance to HIV infection and contributing to the earlier onset of AIDS. Productivity in key sectors such as agriculture is depleted as workers fall ill or migrate.<sup>17</sup>

At a recent Southern African consultation of humanitarian assistance stakeholders in the region, it was emphasised that “an urgent review of certain government policies such as poverty reduction strategies for the vulnerable population is needed” to address food insecurity in the region.<sup>18</sup>

### **Southern African Crop and Food Supply Assessment FAO / WFP – June 2003**

| Country               | Population in Need of Food Aid in Southern Africa 2003/04 |                  |                  |                  |                     | Estimated Cereal MT needs to be met through food aid |
|-----------------------|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|--|
|                       | Rural Apr-Jun/03  | Rural Jul-Sep/03 | Rural Oct-Dec/03 | Rural Jan-Mar/04 | Urban Apr/03-Mar/04 |  |
| Lesotho               | 250,000   | 145,000          | 250,000          | 270,000          | -                   | 33,000   |
| Malawi                |   | 150,000          | 300,000          | 400,000          | -                   | 30,000   |
| Mozambique            | 802,000   | 802,000          | 964,000          | 964,000          | -                   | 156,000  |
| Swaziland             | 132,000   | 158,000          | 158,000          | 217,000          | -                   | 24,000   |
| Zambia                | *   | *                | *                | *                | -                   | *  |
| Zimbabwe              | 844,000   | 2,284,000        | 3,419,000        | 4,423,000        | 1,000,000           | 611,000  |
| <b>Regional Total</b> | <b>2,028,000</b>  | <b>3,539,000</b> | <b>5,091,000</b> | <b>6,274,000</b> | <b>1,000,000</b>    | <b>854,000</b>                                       |

Source: Maintaining the Momentum: Summary Note of the Regional Consultation on Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Southern Africa, Johannesburg: June 2003. See [www.sahims.net](http://www.sahims.net)

## **1.2. The HIV/AIDS Crisis**

Five Africans die every minute as a result of HIV/AIDS.<sup>19</sup> Three-quarters of the 42 million known people infected by HIV/AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>20</sup> 65% of the world's people living with HIV/AIDS live in Southern Africa.<sup>21</sup> The average population infection rate in Southern Africa is above 20%<sup>22</sup>, with infection rates between 20% and 39% in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.<sup>23</sup> Only Zambia has begun to contain the pandemic.<sup>24</sup>

One in three adults in Botswana, one in four adults in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Swaziland, and one in five adults in South Africa and Zambia are infected and are likely to die in the next 7 to 10 years.<sup>25</sup> In Swaziland, 40% of pregnant women are HIV infected.<sup>26</sup> A 15-year-old boy in Botswana has an 80% chance of dying of AIDS.<sup>27</sup> The social impact is fast becoming devastating.<sup>28</sup>

Recent studies demonstrate that the cyclical relationship between HIV/AIDS and malnutrition as a result of hunger also widens and deepens poverty.<sup>29</sup>

A recent Catholic Relief Services study of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa points to the temptation to think of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and poverty only in a linear fashion: that poverty leads to HIV/AIDS vulnerability and it is therefore critical to improve living conditions in order to prevent new HIV infection.<sup>30</sup> While hunger lowers resistance and forces people into high-risk behaviour, a livelihood survey of four villages in Tanzania found that villages with disposable income from productive agricultural activity exhibited higher rates of high-risk behaviour than poorer villages.<sup>31</sup>

Behavioural determinants contribute substantially to the perpetuation of the epidemic in Southern Africa.<sup>32</sup>

The long-term consequences of concentrated HIV/AIDS prevalence for development in the region are grave, the implications of which we have yet to fully grasp.

Two thousand teachers die of AIDS every year in Zambia.<sup>33</sup> In Mozambique, 68% of children with both parents alive attend school, compared with only 24% of those with no parents.<sup>34</sup> In South Africa, nearly a quarter of children living in households affected by AIDS are maternal orphans and nearly 10% of girls orphaned as a result of AIDS are out of school compared with 5% of boys.<sup>35</sup>

“Promoting education will be pointless while teachers are dying and girls drop out of school to care for their orphaned siblings”, said Stephen Lewis, the United Nations (UN) special envoy for AIDS, addressing civil society representatives ahead of the G8 Kananaskis summit in 2002.<sup>36</sup>

A relevant study in Uganda found that 65% of AIDS-affected households were forced to sell property in order to care for a sick family member.<sup>37</sup> In addition to declines in productivity and the loss of productive assets, the HIV/AIDS pandemic causes a break in the transfer of valuable livelihood knowledge from one generation to the next.<sup>38</sup>

However, there are some promising signs in regard to HIV/AIDS treatment in the region. The Namibian government will sign an agreement this year to expand its anti-retroviral treatment programme to newborn babies and infected parents. Through a \$14.8 million grant from the Global Fund, Malawi is expected to provide free treatment to as many as 50,000 people through public health facilities. Botswana has already engaged in several new developments including the introduction of free anti-retroviral therapy in the public sector, the opening of nationwide counselling and testing centres, and the expansion of condom distribution.<sup>39</sup>

But at current low levels of donor support, from October 2003 the Global Fund will not be able to support all expected projects such as that in Malawi.<sup>40</sup>

Hard-won development gains and increases in life expectancy are being reversed across Southern Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS. The region requires a comprehensive strategy to manage this crisis, at once addressing a range of short-term and long-term factors including food security, prevention, treatment, palliative care, and special attention to the needs of children affected.

### **1.3. Debt, Aid and Trade Imbalances**

Africa currently pays \$14 billion a year in debt service<sup>41</sup> and receives a net \$14 billion in development aid.<sup>42</sup> Six of Southern Africa's fourteen countries are recognised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s.<sup>43</sup> Southern Africa owes 35% of Sub-Saharan Africa's total foreign debt<sup>44</sup>, much of which is apartheid-caused.<sup>45</sup> The illegitimacy of much of Southern Africa's debt remains a contested issue.<sup>46</sup>

The enhanced HIPC debt relief initiative under the IMF and World Bank has failed to lift the region out of its debt crisis despite a \$1 billion top-up of the HIPC trust fund announced at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis summit. By June 2002, four African countries were forecast to pay more in debt service after HIPC debt relief and five countries to pay just as much as they did before<sup>47</sup>. After debt relief, Zambia is still paying \$150 million a year on debt service and Malawi will pay \$50 million a year.<sup>48</sup>

Three problems related to the HIPC debt relief initiative have consistently been raised by civil society organisations in the region.

The first relates to HIPC's 'debt sustainability' formula. Debt sustainability under HIPC is measured as a ratio of export earnings rather than government revenue. However, tumbling international commodity prices related to subsidies in Europe and North America and volatile currency markets mean that this ratio is highly unpredictable and unreliable, often leaving poor countries with lower export earnings than anticipated.<sup>49</sup>


The second relates to HIPC's 'debt sustainability' rather than poverty reduction focus. HIPC is premised on a structural adjustment conditionality framework. Despite the IMF and World Bank's renaming the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the introduction of country-developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a condition for debt relief under HIPC, concerns remain about the 'structural adjustment' macroeconomic framework of the PRGF with which PRSPs are implicitly required to accord. An immense amount of research has been conducted in the region demonstrating the negative social development impact that structural adjustment programmes have had in the region.<sup>50</sup> Case study after case study in the region points to the incompatibility between PRSPs and the PRGF.<sup>51</sup>

The third problem with HIPC concerns its 'moral hazard' reluctance to deliver real debt cancellation. Despite research showing how debt cancellation works effectively as a precondition for increased poverty-reduction spending in Africa, the creditors still argue that substantial debt cancellation will result in irresponsible new borrowing and reckless spending in poor countries. A 2002 Jubilee report on government spending in ten African HIPCs that received minimal debt relief found that spending on education increased to \$1.3 billion compared to \$929 million in 1998. Spending on health care rose by 70%. Military spending remained constant between 1998 and 2002.<sup>52</sup>

The international development discourse at the turn of the millennium about 'trade not aid' is shifting to 'aid for trade'. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) strongly advocates private sector development for increased trade and investment as a key component to Africa's growth for poverty reduction.<sup>53</sup> However, Africa is already too dependent on the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa's trade in goods with the rest of the world accounted for 56% of GDP in 2001 while the same ratio for North America was only 13.2%, 12.8% for Western Europe, 23.7% for Latin America, and 15.2% for Asia.<sup>54</sup> This does not translate into more effective poverty reduction. Increased trade could guarantee greater foreign debt service capacity but will not guarantee progress towards poverty reduction targets.

### % Share of Total Southern African Debt

1999 - Source: SADC Annual Report 2000 - 2001



South Africa accounts 21.5% of the population but more than 66% of the GDP of Southern Africa.<sup>55</sup> South African exports to other African countries increased sevenfold from \$685 million in 1991 to \$4.8 billion in 2001, accounting for 18% of South African exports in 2001.<sup>56</sup> In that decade, South Africa became one of the top ten investors in, and trading partners of, many African countries.<sup>57</sup> As the economic powerhouse in the region, regional trade and capital flow adjustments disproportionately benefit South African economic interests, sometimes to the detriment of development objectives in other Southern African countries.

In recent years South Africa cancelled Namibian and Mozambican debts and bought DRC debt. Civil society organisations are increasingly becoming attentive that the positive and negative effects of South African business interests and economic interventions in the Southern African region cannot be ignored in an assessment of the region's prospects of meeting development targets.

| <b>South African Trade with Other Southern African Countries 2002</b> |  |                                  |                                   |
|---|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Country   | Exports from South Africa<br>2002<br>\$ million at June 2003 conversion from ZAR | Rank in Overall SA Trade<br>2002 | Annual Growth<br>2001 - 2002<br>% |
| <b>Zimbabwe</b>   | 1,001  | 8                                | 37.3                              |
| <b>Mozambique</b>   | 879  | 11                               | 13.8                              |
| <b>Zambia</b>   | 759  | 13                               | 13.8                              |
| <b>Angola</b>   | 470  | 21                               | 27.4                              |
| <b>Mauritius</b>  | 368  | 23                               | 33.2                              |
| <b>Malawi</b>   | 326  | 24                               | 25.5                              |
| <b>Tanzania</b>   | 276  | 27                               | 32.6                              |
| <b>DRC</b>  | 223  | 33                               | 62.6                              |

Source: South African Department of Trade & Industry


#### 1.4. Governance through 'Democracy without a Choice'

While the prospects for political stability in Southern Africa have increased dramatically with a political resolution to apartheid in South Africa, the end of the Mozambican and Angolan wars, democratic elections in Lesotho, and progress towards a democratic settlement in the DRC, civil strife in Zimbabwe and Swaziland continues to escalate. In addition, tensions between governments and civil society organisations in Malawi, Zambia, and South Africa often flare up, primarily over economic policy concerns. However, regional geopolitical tensions relating to the DRC war seem to have abated.

Despite overwhelming popular support for multi-party democracy in the region, effective systems of participatory democracy have not yet been entrenched in the region.<sup>58</sup>

The political and human rights situation in Zimbabwe is of major concern. In May 2003 alone, 16 cases of torture, 24 cases of unlawful arrest, and 13 cases of unlawful detention were reported by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.<sup>59</sup> There is no end in sight to the political turmoil that has gripped the country and decimated the Zimbabwean economy, with persistent and massive food and fuel shortages.

Reports of Political Violence in Zimbabwe: January – June 2003  
Source: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, 17 June 2003



The Afrobarometer, a comparative series of national civil society sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens to democracy and other aspects of development in Africa, released the results of a survey in 7 Southern African countries in October 2000.<sup>60</sup> The survey found that throughout the region, only minorities of citizens feel that their elected representatives are interested in what they think or want.



| <b>Popular Opinions on the Most Important Problems Facing Society (%)</b> |                 |                |               |                |                     |               |                 |
|---|-----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|
|   | <b>Botswana</b> | <b>Lesotho</b> | <b>Malawi</b> | <b>Namibia</b> | <b>South Africa</b> | <b>Zambia</b> | <b>Zimbabwe</b> |
| <b>AIDS</b>   | 24              | -              | -             | 14             | 13                  | -             | -               |
| <b>Corruption</b>   | -               | -              | -             | -              | 10                  | -             | -               |
| <b>Crime / Security</b>   | 12              | 28             | 28            | -              | 60                  | -             | -               |
| <b>Economy</b>  | -               | -              | 48            | -              | -                   | 20            | 74              |
| <b>Education</b>  | 20              | -              | 12            | 46             | 13                  | 31            | -               |
| <b>Farming / Agriculture</b>  | 14              | -              | 13            | -              | -                   | 26            | -               |
| <b>Food</b>   | -               | 20             | 26            | -              | -                   | -             | -               |
| <b>General Services</b>   | -               | -              | 10            | 21             | -                   | -             | -               |
| <b>Health</b>   | 15              | -              | 29            | 18             | 12                  | 41            | 18              |
| <b>Housing</b>  | -               | -              | -             | -              | 25                  | -             | -               |
| <b>Job Creation</b>   | 58              | 63             | 11            | 54             | 76                  | 32            | 37              |
| <b>Poverty / Destitution</b>  | 17              | -              | 11            | -              | 11                  | 14            | -               |
| <b>Transportation</b>   | -               | -              | 16            | -              | -                   | 18            | -               |
| <b>Water</b>  | -               | -              | 16            | -              | -                   | -             | -               |

Source: Afrobarometer Paper No. 8: Views of Democracy in South Africa & the Region: Trends and Comparisons, October 2000  
Includes responses of at least 10%

| <b>Government Performance Ratings (%)</b>                   |                 |                |               |                |                     |               |                 |
|---|-----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|
|   | <b>Botswana</b> | <b>Lesotho</b> | <b>Malawi</b> | <b>Namibia</b> | <b>South Africa</b> | <b>Zambia</b> | <b>Zimbabwe</b> |
| <b>Creating jobs</b>  | 51.6            | 38.3           | 30.8          | 47.1           | 10.2                | 26.0          | 20.1            |
| <b>Building houses</b>                                      | 43.7            | 11.8           | 38.2          | 58.1           | 49.6                | 35.6          | 25.9            |
| <b>Ensuring that prices remain stable</b>                   | 41.0            | 19.8           | 07.8          | 37.6           | 17.3                | 28.0          | 14.2            |
| <b>Reducing crime</b>                                       | 63.1            | 43.6           | 21.9          | 46.3           | 17.9                | 34.6          | 31.0            |
| <b>Improving health services</b>                            | 69.4            | 50.1           | 45.7          | 62.1           | 42.6                | 36.9          | 34.8            |
| <b>Addressing the educational needs of all</b>              | 70.9            | 56.5           | 62.1          | 61.6           | 49.4                | 42.6          | 45.8            |
| <b>Managing the economy</b>                                 | 60.4            | 35.5           | 25.2          | 45.4           | 27.5                | 32.6          | 15.9            |
| <b>Delivering basic services like water and electricity</b> | 69.4            | 35.0           | 65.4          | 54.6           | 60.7                | 39.9          | 36.2            |
| <b>Making sure everyone has enough land</b>                 | 57.1            | 32.1           | 50.6          | 38.7           | 37.7                | 49.1          | 21.7            |

Source: Afrobarometer Paper No. 8: Views of Democracy in South Africa & the Region: Trends and Comparisons, October 2000

The survey provides a picture of civil society's expressed "demand" for democratic participation and its perceived "supply" in Southern African countries.

In Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia there appears to be a relative equilibrium of high demand and supply. In Namibia, there is a distinct imbalance with relatively weak demand but a relatively high level of satisfaction with the democratic system. South Africa shows a similar pattern, with lower levels of perceived supply. In Zimbabwe, there is a severe imbalance in the opposite direction. There is a strong demand for democracy, but a strong sense that the political system is not democratic. Lesotho has both a low demand and supply.

Civil society has relatively low levels of trust in public institutions in the region. There are alarmingly low levels of public trust in parliaments. Whereas there is no similar comparative data to assess trends for the other Southern African countries, compared to 1998 results, South African civil society became significantly less trusting of elected institutions, saw them as less responsive to public opinion, and became less satisfied with their performance than before.

| <b>Trust in Public Institutions (%)</b> |                 |                |               |                |                     |               |                 |
|---|-----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|
|   | <b>Botswana</b> | <b>Lesotho</b> | <b>Malawi</b> | <b>Namibia</b> | <b>South Africa</b> | <b>Zambia</b> | <b>Zimbabwe</b> |
| <b>The President / Prime Minister</b>   | 43.6            | 40.4           | 50.0          | 72.5           | 41.3                | 37.4          | 19.4            |
| <b>Parliament</b>                       | 46.2            | 29.7           | 32.8          | 50.7           | 33.7                | 23.1          | 17.0            |
| <b>Provincial Government</b>            | -               | -              | -             | -              | 27.6                | -             | -               |
| <b>Local Government</b>                 | 41.3            | 18.2           | -             | 47.3           | 22.6                | 20.4          | 28.1            |
| <b>The Army</b>                         | 71.2            | 39.2           | 71.1          | 66.0           | 43.9                | 53.3          | 52.2            |
| <b>The Police</b>                       | 60.0            | 40.4           | 41.7          | 68.9           | 35.0                | 37.5          | 35.5            |
| <b>Courts of Law</b>                    | 64.3            | 42.2           | 47.1          | 63.6           | 43.3                | 63.6          | 42.2            |
| <b>Criminal Justice System</b>          | -               | -              | -             | -              | 38.2                | -             | -               |
| <b>Electoral Commission</b>             | 54.1            | 31.6           | 49.0          | 65.8           | 48.7                | 44.5          | 25.9            |
| <b>Public Broadcasting Corporation</b>  | 70.8            | 52.7           | 56.2          | 84.0           | 62.4                | 57.5          | 40.0            |

Source: Afrobarometer Paper No. 8: Views of Democracy in South Africa & the Region: Trends and Comparisons, October 2000

Consistent with the objectives of the MDGs, unemployment, the delivery of effective social services like health care and education, and poverty are the main issues of concern to citizens in the region. Civil society discontent with government performance in Southern Africa and the lack of confidence in democratic participation turns on economic policy and social development concerns.

Southern Africa's poverty complex at once contributes to low levels of confidence in the functioning of democratic political systems in the region and is reinforced by a lack of an effective participatory democratic determination of socio-economic development strategies. Zambia, for example, sold more than two hundred public corporations to stimulate foreign investment, reduce government spending, and earn foreign currency, with a severe negative impact on employment. The IMF pushed for further liberalisation including the sale of ZNCB, Zambia's national bank. This provoked an outcry from trade unions, churches, NGOs, and students. In response, Zambian parliamentarians voted in December 2002 to block the privatisation of ZNCB. The IMF has threatened to withdraw debt relief unless the parliament reverses its decision.<sup>61</sup>

Democratic development for poverty reduction in the region requires attention to be given both to local contextual factors and the global socio-economic development policy regime. A social development paradigm in Southern Africa that focuses on local and national institutional development towards achieving the MDGs without a corresponding focus on transforming the framework of the global economic policy regime will be ineffective.

Martin Khor of the Third World Network, for example, points to four reasons why even the semblance of national participatory democratic processes towards strategies for achieving the MDGs in countries such as those of Southern Africa cannot yield effective results under current global policy prescriptions.<sup>62</sup>

The continuous fall in prices of export commodities has caused tremendous income and foreign exchange losses to many developing countries and is a major cause of persistent or increased poverty at the local and community levels. The financial instability and sharp currency fluctuations caused by large inflows and outflows of external funds have led many developing countries into financial and economic crises, with dramatic and sudden increases in poverty rates. Many countries have suffered declines in or threats to their industrial jobs and farmers' livelihoods as a result of inappropriate import liberalisation policies, partly

or mainly due to external policy influences resulting from loan conditionalities or multinational trade rules.

Cutbacks in social service expenditures arising from structural adjustment programmes, as well as the 'user-should-pay' principle, have been identified as a significant factor in the deterioration of the well being of vulnerable and poor groups in several developing countries.

These examples, as well as the continuation of the debt crisis in many countries, show that attempts to improve domestic policies, however exemplary, are insufficient if developing countries are to attain the MDGs.<sup>63</sup>

Southern Africa's poverty complex is inextricably linked to problems in global trade, finance, and governance. So too is its ability to meet the MDGs. These problems limit the region from developing effective systems of democratic participation for poverty reduction in the region, resulting in democratic structures without the ability to freely determine appropriate policy frameworks.

The failure to transform poverty reduction policies from a social-economic (developmental) goal-driven framework rather than a macroeconomic target framework as promoted by the IMF, will leave Southern Africa spiralling to the bottom of its poverty trap.<sup>64</sup> The MDGs can provide Southern African civil society organisations with a credible, politically endorsed, global framework for democratic institutional *and* policy transformation in the interests of the poor at the local level.

## **2. Organised Civil Society in Southern Africa: A Volatile and Contested Terrain**

'Civil society' is a loose concept. Customarily used in reference to civil society organisations (CSOs), primarily non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society includes a wide spectrum of community-based organisations, trade unions, religious communities, advocacy groups, policy research institutions, private business institutions, and social movements.

Civil society participation can take many forms, including community consultation in specific development projects at the local level. This happens extensively, for example, in various development projects run by the government in South Africa. There are also a number of thematic forums initiated by the South African government on key strategic concerns such as the South African National AIDS Council, the National Anti-Corruption Forum, and the Moral Regeneration Movement that include strong and meaningful CSO participation. However, institutionalised social dialogue organs such as South Africa's National Economic Development and Labour Advisory Council (NEDLAC) have proved to be ineffective mechanisms for determining national priorities and building cohesion towards social development objectives.

Civil society participation intends to ensure buy-in of key sectoral stakeholders towards the effective implementation of development strategies, in the framework of building a social compact based on partnership within a broad consensus. For this, the engagement of popular CSOs that are rooted in community experiences is required, not just well-resourced CSO lobby groups that are socially dislocated from the poor.

The business sector is of a unique character that promotes and defends business interests. Business does not organically fit within the conventional understanding of CSOs as “people’s organisations”. This analysis of CSOs focuses primarily on CSOs as popular organisations.

As in other parts of the world, Southern African civil society organisations are not a homogenous grouping. Particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe, CSOs are divided roughly along political lines that accord with the national party-political spectrum.

## **2.1. CSO Participation in PRSP Processes**

The introduction of PRSP processes conditioned on civil society participation has given rise to increased civil society coordination and policy engagement in Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Tanzania.<sup>65</sup> While PRSP processes in those countries created a new basis for partnerships between civil society, government, and donors that did not exist in the past, the processes were generally characterised by mutual suspicion and distrust.<sup>66</sup>

The Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) was born out of civil society’s desire to participate effectively through a coordinated effort. In Zambia, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) was formed to spearhead civil society participation in the PRSP process. Frustrated with the limitations of the PRSP process, CSPR created a parallel process through which it developed a comprehensive civil society input, two-thirds of which found its way into Zambia’s official PRSP.<sup>67</sup>

However, civil society organisations participating in the processes all pointed to serious limitations in the potential impact of PRSPs. Because blueprints for PRSP processes were provided by the IMF and World Bank, there was a tendency for governments to develop PRSPs according to what they thought would be acceptable to the IMF and World Bank. This tendency was reinforced by the pre-determined macroeconomic framework of the PRGF within which PRSPs function, and by making PRSPs a condition for debt relief under HIPC. Civil society organisations felt that this negated national ownership of the PRSP and real participation, and constrained the adoption of more innovative poverty reduction policy proposals.<sup>68</sup>

Nonetheless, PRSP processes stimulated a national focus on development objectives. In some cases, progressive proposals supported by civil society were adopted in national PRSPs. These include:

- Continued public protection of the cashew nut industry in Mozambique;
- Abolition of primary school fees in Tanzania;
- Linking identified poverty reduction priority areas to national budgets; and
- Ring-fencing social development expenditure allocations.<sup>69</sup>

Similarly innovative initiatives have happened in other countries in the region that are not required to develop PRSPs, such as the free provision of a basic minimum supply of water and electricity to all South Africans with access.

Challenges identified by CSOs for more effective participation in PRSP processes included:

- Building capacity through economic literacy education;
- Increasing the research component of their work;
- Intensifying advocacy work;
- Developing independent CSO proposals through parallel processes;
- Accessing information and building an information network; and
- National, regional, and international networking with other CSOs to strengthen impact.<sup>70</sup>

However, with the exception of Mauritius, there has been very little explicit CSO take-up of the MDGs framework. The official launch of Mauritius' Status Report on the MDGs in October 2002, was followed by a civil society forum organised to stimulate a participatory dialogue on the findings of the report. Subsequently, a youth forum was held to determine the role of youth in campaigning for the MDGs. Similar activities on Rodrigues Island<sup>71</sup> are scheduled for 2003, including parliamentary, NGO, and youth forums.

Typical areas prioritised by CSOs in PRSP processes in the region were education, health care, agriculture, water and sanitation, and economic infrastructure. Cross-cutting issues were gender, HIV/AIDS, protection of the environment. All these correspond directly with the MDGs. However, CSOs did not expressly promote the MDGs during PRSP processes.<sup>72</sup>

There are many reasons for the general absence of discourse on the MDGs framework among Southern African CSOs. In the PRSP process, many felt that "the MDGs were foisted onto countries".<sup>73</sup> But the reasons go deeper than that. An analysis of the state of organised civil society in the region will reveal the complexity of effective CSO engagement in public participatory processes towards social development objectives.

## **2.2. Enforced Participatory Processes**

CSO participation imposed as a condition on trade and financing agreements are bound to have serious limitations. These are seen not only in the PRSP process but also in the Cotonou trade agreement processes and the raging debate about Northern support for NEPAD. Governments in the region resent compulsory CSO participation as a form of conditionality. This often results in government representatives opposing civil society engagement on the basis that CSOs do not necessarily represent the interests of the poor in Southern Africa; that they are un-elected or 'self-appointed' and therefore do not have legitimacy to co-determine policy frameworks.<sup>74</sup>

## **2.3. "This is not our consensus"**

Popular CSOs do not see themselves as part of the development of the new 'global compact' through UN processes. The 2002 Monterrey Financing for Development conference drew together, for the first time, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), private business representatives, and a range of CSOs across social sectors into a representative international political process that uniquely included finance, foreign affairs, and social development ministers, to address the defining dilemma facing global human progress: what is the right relationship between politics and economics in

determining the future of half the world's population who live in poverty? However, CSOs interpret the drive to multilateral policy coherence epitomised in the Monterrey consensus as a co-option of the UN into the Washington consensus<sup>75</sup> framework rather than the incorporation of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in UN frameworks.<sup>76</sup> Consensus building towards multilateral policy coherence in a government-business-IMF/World Bank/WTO compact results in a drive towards the lowest common development denominator. This led CSOs to reject the Monterrey consensus as “not our consensus”.

The MDGs are perceived by key CSOs in Southern Africa to be part of the global compact of which they are deeply distrustful. Policy analysis CSOs in the region emphasise the need for upward policy coherence based on social development needs rather than downward and horizontal policy coherence according to pre-determined socio-economic macro-strategies; i.e. the global socio-economic policy consensus should align itself to primary social development needs rather than social development strategies being framed within a globally agreed economic compact.

CSOs in the region are highly sensitive to the interplay between economics and politics: “does politics control economics or does economics control politics”, they would ask. The point is made that the economic policy framework for achieving sustainable development was set in Monterrey before the needs of sustainable development were identified in the Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), rather than the other way around.<sup>77</sup>

#### **2.4. The Self-Understanding of CSOs in Southern Africa**

Debates have raged amongst Southern African CSOs about the nature and role of CSOs in the context of a highly contested socio-economic development policy context. There is a high degree of uneasiness amongst CSOs engaged in advocacy work in the region to CSOs simply being implementers of pre-determined government policies as ‘privatised’ service providers.

CSOs in the region also want to go beyond performing a monitoring role. They want to participate meaningfully in policy formulation. However, Washington-consensus-type thinking that places participatory democracy in juxtaposition to rapid economic growth for poverty reduction still constrains meaningful CSO (and often parliamentary) participation in policy formulation, especially economic policy development.<sup>78</sup>

The rise of new social movements in the region in response to social and economic justice concerns on issues such as structural adjustment, privatisation, debt cancellation, land and agrarian reform, and HIV/AIDS have exposed divergent understandings of the nature of civil society among CSOs.

Established CSOs in the region have tended to display a Gramscian self-understanding where civil society is the terrain in which the state contests and establishes its legitimacy. Such CSOs would engage in advocacy work on targeted policy issues to *transform* state institutions and government policies. However, new social movements tend to display a more Hegelian self-understanding where civil society is necessarily contra-state and works to *replace* the state.<sup>79</sup> Governments in the region generally see such movements as a threat to their political legitimacy and, as a matter of principle, tend to oppose the policy

issues raised by such movements. Such dynamics are further complicated by civil conflict and human rights concerns in countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

The new social movements are popular organisations. They are deeply rooted in impoverished local communities and therefore represent a crucial CSO constituency that needs to be heard and engaged in regard to social development concerns. However, even within the new social movements there are differing political perspectives, sometimes at odds with one another. Anti-globalisation movements, for example, must still reconcile whether they support a stronger developmental state or more 'anarchist' tendencies.

The contested nature of CSOs in Southern Africa results not only in a habitually antagonistic relationship between governments and CSOs, making a constructive partnership for poverty reduction extremely tenuous, but also in a highly volatile CSO environment. Political parties in the region sometimes actively work to gain control of "troublesome" CSO groupings and CSOs themselves compete for dominance in determining the political perspective that would be regarded as representative of civil society. The experience of South Africa's national NGO coalition (SANGOCO) and extremely divisive experiences of CSO participation at the 2001 Durban World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) and the WSSD are two recent examples of this.

### **2.5. Research and Policy Analysis: A Southern African CSO Blind Spot**

Even though CSOs routinely argue their wish to participate more effectively in policy formulation processes, with a few notable exceptions in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South Africa and some regional CSOs, Southern African CSOs have done very little to develop systematic local research and policy analysis processes. Such capacity is crucial to effective CSO participation in the development, monitoring and transformation of poverty reduction strategies. The absence of sufficient activity on this front often results in the perception that CSOs in the region are not serious about policy work and that their campaigning rhetoric is unsubstantiated. It leaves CSOs wide open to the charge that their demands for more effective poverty reduction strategies are unfounded.

In recent months, there has been increasing regional CSO activity on NEPAD and the African Union (AU).<sup>80</sup> Again, the MDG framework has not been incorporated into these processes. However, The MDGs provide a unique opportunity for increased and more focused research, popular mobilisation, advocacy, and resource mobilisation among Southern African CSOs. It also provides an opportunity for enhanced regional CSO networking and partnerships on common agendas.

### **3. Can NEPAD deliver the MDGs in Southern Africa?<sup>81</sup>**

In the context of a strong resurgence of global civil society activism on African development issues especially in the second half of the 1990s, NEPAD has contributed a tremendous amount to putting African development squarely back on the global political agenda. Its drivers are to be applauded for this remarkable achievement. This has resulted in a new African and global political will, expressed in the UN Millennium Declaration, to turning Africa's socio-economic decline around.

NEPAD introduces African-controlled conditionality to international financing and trade mechanisms. To the extent that NEPAD outlines the conditions on which the partnerships between African and industrialised countries will be based, with the

exception of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), it does not offer an entirely new model. NEPAD largely reiterates the conditions that have been demanded by creditors and donors in the past, both in terms of governance and macroeconomic strategy. However, it does include a proposed process for mutual North-South evaluation and accountability, even though this is not yet adequately developed.

### **3.1. Beyond Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers?**

It is still unclear whether NEPAD will replace the PRSP process or whether it simply intends to place the PRSP process within a continental macro-framework. NEPAD officials have made conflicting statements about this, even though the NEPAD document indicates that debt relief should be linked to detailed poverty reduction plans. While NEPAD might eliminate direct PRGF control of the PRSP process, this would only affect countries that explicitly commit themselves to NEPAD. NEPAD participants would ultimately face a similar system of externally imposed conditionalities, albeit from a source closer to home and through a system of voluntary benefit and reward rather than sanctions. However, NEPAD does provide the opportunity to extend poverty reduction strategy processes to all African countries (rather than just HIPC) because of its pan-African scope.

NEPAD should be seen as an African continental PRSP. It follows the logic advanced by the IMF/World Bank for the development of national PRSPs – except that civil society participation was omitted in the initial NEPAD development process.

The same critique levelled at PRSP processes apply to NEPAD. It is unlikely that NEPAD, within its internal logic, will develop into a policy framework that deviates from structural-adjustment-type frameworks.

### **3.2. An African Negotiating Bloc?**

NEPAD strives to build an African multilateral consensus within the framework of the global compact given expression in the Monterrey consensus. It works to develop a coherent and consistent African negotiating bloc in multilateral forums. However, understood in the context of shifting geopolitical alignments on the continent, there is the risk that Africa may be divided into two camps: those backing NEPAD and those not enthusiastic about it.<sup>82</sup> The creation of winners and losers in Africa through NEPAD as a voluntary process based on economic benefit for those who accede to its processes and the neglect of those who do not is a danger for the achievement of the MDGs in the Southern African region as a whole. Reversals in progress towards the MDGs will occur for the whole region as evidenced in the current food security crisis and the HIV/AIDS crisis if the region as a whole does not progress in the same direction towards the MDGs.

Even so, NEPAD has the potential to create a bloc of African leaders who can, if their policy and strategy advice is appropriate, radically alter Africa's future participation in multilateral organisations.



### **3.3. Private Capital Development and Africa's Recovery**

NEPAD takes a politically pragmatic rather than rights-based approach to social development objectives. It argues for what can reasonably be achieved given the current global socio-political and economic power relations.

It sees private capital as the missing link to Africa's development and advocates for an end to Africa's wars, governance reform, and structural adjustment so as to create the optimal conditions for increased private capital flows to the continent.<sup>83</sup>

The upshot is that stronger African economies, such as that of South Africa, are seen to be the engines of economic growth for the region. However, the impact that mushrooming South African private investment in and exports to the rest of the region is sometimes detrimental to local small-scale producers in those countries, similar to the negative impact that Northern subsidies and currency fluctuation has on South African earnings.

Such impacts can compound the reversal of MDG-related objectives in the poorer countries of the region and create greater regional imbalances in progress towards the MDGs.

### **3.4. Debt Cancellation: A Pre-Condition for Sustained MDG Progress**

NEPAD proposes a new approach to debt cancellation that links debt reduction to government revenues and projected spending on costed poverty reduction programmes according to nationally determined goals. In debt relief discussions later this year, NEPAD is expected to propose limiting national debt service to not more than 10% of government revenue rather than export earnings.

Given the current poverty complex in Southern Africa, achieving the MDGs in the region requires high levels of stable and predictable development financing for effectively managed national programmes according to national and regional priorities. Direct budget support through such measures as debt cancellation is a highly effective and reliable source of development financing, as demonstrated by recent research findings of the Jubilee debt cancellation movement.

In addition, the experience of HIPC's in Southern Africa demonstrates that debt cancellation is a pre-condition for sustained and sustainable development, not just a form of resource mobilisation. Poverty reduction strategies premised on 'debt sustainability' (such as in PRSP processes) rather than goal-oriented social development objectives are circular strategies that generate familiar problems related to structural adjustment because the macroeconomic framework of the 'debt sustainability' model remains the same as before.

Special consideration must also be given to odious debts and questions about the legitimacy of Southern Africa's apartheid-caused debt.

NEPAD's developing debt cancellation proposals provide promising entry points towards integrating the MDGs into its framework. However, debt cancellation is viewed in NEPAD as a supplementary rather than primary concern. The central pillar on which

NEPAD's strategy rests on economic development through the promotion of private capital.

### **3.5. NEPAD, Trade, and Food Security**

NEPAD strongly advocates increased African access to European and North American markets through the removal of trade barriers and the abandonment of state subsidies in industrialised countries that distort market-determined commodity. NEPAD also promises to provide greater access to African markets through increased regionalisation.

Rich countries subsidise their agricultural products to the tune of \$1 billion each day or annually to much more than the amount of Africa's total debt, leading to massive over-production especially of agricultural and dairy products that are dumped on global markets. This depresses prices so that African countries earn far less for their products than they would otherwise, leading at once to lower foreign income and greater debt service problems.

But despite the unfairness of the current system of trade and recent announcements of the phasing out of some subsidies in the European Union (EU) excepting France, market access limitations are not the central problem for Africa in the global trading system. Only those African countries with stronger export capacities are likely to benefit from better terms of trade. Even then, large monopoly agribusiness interests are better placed to benefit from these changes than small-scale farmers who produce primarily for local markets, thus providing basic levels of community food security in the region. A more immediate problem is the indiscriminate removal of trading regulations designed to protect industry, services, and agriculture. This deepens food and economic insecurity.

NEPAD's emphasis on market access is intended to facilitate export-oriented growth. This strategy does not give sufficient attention to the need to reorient production from export agriculture led by big corporate interests to small-scale production primarily for the local market and protected from unfair competition from subsidised Northern products by tariffs and quotas.<sup>84</sup>

While increased earning capacities through the removal of Northern subsidies is good for job retention in large-scale agriculture and industry, the combination of the HIV/AIDS and food crises in the region demand a developmental approach to trade issues (especially agricultural trade) that is focused on local community capacities for food production.

### **3.6. People-Centred Development is a Secondary Focus**

The MDGs provide a people-centred framework for achieving development targets. NEPAD, on the other hand, focuses primarily on strategies intended to deliver long-term and indirect poverty alleviation through macro-objectives.<sup>85</sup> While long-term macro-objectives are worthy and necessary aspects of social development planning, Southern Africa requires a mix of short-, medium-, and long-term strategies for sustained poverty reduction if it is to break out of the poverty spiral in which it is caught.

In its current form, NEPAD offers no clear and reliable plan to deliver direct and immediate responses to the growing numbers of impoverished people in Southern Africa or to address the region's unemployment crisis. These should be central objectives of a socio-economic development plan for Southern Africa such as NEPAD.

In this way, the MDGs pose a challenge to NEPAD: How, if at all, can NEPAD at once achieve desirable long-term political and economic development goals while advancing (or at least not sacrificing) shorter-term social development objectives?

### **3.7. Partnerships?**

Local communities and civil society organisations had no meaningful opportunities to engage in the initial development of NEPAD. This is now routinely acknowledged by African political leaders and NEPAD officials. However, the complete rejection of NEPAD by some CSOs based in its failure to engage CSOs directly is an unfortunate and inappropriate form of protest.

The point of raising concern about civil society engagement is not whether a particular group or social sector was consulted or not. It is more that, by design, the NEPAD process excluded mechanisms to ensure CSO information and engagement about the strategic orientation and content of NEPAD so that it is informed by the lived experience, the needs and knowledge of the communities who are meant to benefit from its new vision for Africa's development. There can be no sustainable development without the informed participation of the communities affected.<sup>86</sup>

The MDGs similarly do not arise out of a process of direct CSO engagement at the local or global level. Like NEPAD, they advocate for building strong national partnerships towards achieving their objectives. Even though some CSOs have argued that the MDGs do not go far enough, they are expressly informed by local experience and needs.

While NEPAD may be seen as a global policy framework (corresponding to MDG goal 8), the rest of the MDGs may be seen as a local goal-driven framework. However, as previous citations in this paper have explained, both spheres of focus are required to develop a sustainable approach to social progress in Southern Africa. Simply focusing on the achievement of specific development targets without a corresponding focus on an enabling policy environment will not be effective and can even worsen the situation.

Partnerships across social sectors and spheres of governance and policy development are therefore required. However, partnerships do not presume consensus. Effective partnerships, especially towards agreed objectives, necessarily involve critique and contestation.

Whether in agreement with NEPAD's proposals or not, the advent of NEPAD has stimulated enthusiastic debate and networking among CSOs and governments alike across the region on the nature of Southern Africa's poverty complex and what is required to overcome it. This goes a long way to develop new energies for participatory democracy and robust partnerships in the region towards the MDGs.

## **4. Possibilities for CSO Engagement with the MDGs**

### **4.1. The MDGs as Benchmarks**

Recent examples of effective global CSO campaigns for social and economic justice such as the Jubilee debt cancellation campaign were built on clear benchmarks for marking progress. Target-driven goals, even though limited, enhance focus, determination, and planning. They also provide measures for assessing the effectiveness of policy reforms. Levels of debt cancellation, for example, could (and should) be measured in terms of their efficacy towards costed MDG achievement plans. Similarly, budgeting processes could be held accountable to the MDG targets.

The MDGs provide a ready-made and widely supported framework of social development benchmarks that can be effectively used as an advocacy tool by Southern African civil society organisations to monitor and expand social development programmes in the region.

Indeed, the MDGs as benchmarks can serve as a basis for CSOs themselves to find common national and regional ground for more cohesive CSO networks.

### **4.2. Reframing PRSPs and NEPAD**

Going further, the MDGs provide a method not only to measure but also to analyse, evaluate, and transform macroeconomic development frameworks. Holding up the MDGs as clear objectives to which policymakers already have an implicit commitment, PRSP and NEPAD processes in the region can be reframed towards more focused and time-bound objectives that necessitate macro-framework changes. This will enhance upward policy coherence based on local experience and needs rather than limiting local programmes according to predetermined macro-strategies.

National macroeconomic policies, for example, could be assessed according to their ability to deliver on the MDGs rather than the stalemate that often results from perceptions that policy critiques arise out of ideological differences.

### **4.3. Raising New MDG Problem Issues**

There are, however, social development risks associated with target-driven goals that CSOs in the region must be attentive to.

#### **4.3.1. The Limits of Poverty Discourse**

Given the maintenance of macroeconomic austerity, the focus on targets could have a distorting impact on national development planning. Poverty discourse such as the MDG framework highlights particularly the delivery of basic needs, particularly *primary* health care, and *primary* education. Increases in investment in these areas must come out of budgets limited by macroeconomic ceilings, and thus at the expense of other budget items such as secondary and tertiary education.

Whereas in some countries there is the possibility (and urgent need) for redistributive measures such as in South Africa's free basic water supply mechanism, in most countries of the region these are typically painful political choices.

Within the MDG framework, Tanzania's August 2002 PRSP increased funding of basic education from 173.3 billion Tanzanian shillings in 2001-2002 to 215.5 billion in 2003-2004. This one item alone will consume a quarter of government expenditure in 2002-2003. Since this occurred within previously established macro-economic constraints, it requires cuts elsewhere, including to funds for secondary education, which will be cut to 2.6 billion by 2003-2004, amounting to little more one percent of the allocation to primary education.<sup>87</sup>

The long-term impact of such a target-driven process can be detrimental to a country. CSO engagement with the MDG framework should pay particular attention to such distortions to ensure that trade-offs between MDG and other development objectives do not create new cycles of poverty.

### **4.3.2. Regional and National Inequalities**

Southern African societies are characterised by high levels of inequality. While macro-indicators like GDP per capita figures may show positive trends especially in a region whose demographic trend and population growth is projected to change dramatically due to the alarming concentration of HIV/AIDS prevalence, CSOs must constantly interrogate macro-indicators to assess whether (behind the indicators) poverty is in fact abating or increasing through increasing levels of social inequality.

In this regard, particular attention must be given by CSOs to the impact of South African business practices in the rest of the region and continent. While increased regional trade and investment may have many positive effects on economic and political development in the region, the social impact must be closely monitored to prevent deeper inequalities in capital concentration in the region.

## **4.4. Integrating the MDGs into Existing CSO Campaigns**

Some CSOs in Southern Africa are already engaged in research, policy development, and advocacy work that accords well with the MDG framework. Other than participation in PRSP processes in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, much of this work is in the area of development financing. However, there are also some highly developed regional human rights programmes<sup>88</sup> and increasing work on regional and global trade justice issues<sup>89</sup>. Two examples of how the MDGs could be integrated into CSO engagement in ongoing policy development and advocacy work are provided here.

### **4.4.1. The People's Budget and the Basic Income Grant (BIG) Campaign**

For the past three years, South African trade unions, churches, and NGOs have collaborated to develop an alternative budget framework called The People's Budget. The initiative analyses the poverty trap in which half of South Africa's population lives and proposes an alternative macroeconomic framework based on developmental intervention by the government. The People's Budget recommends a review of fiscal policy towards developmental objectives including the provision of a national health insurance and the provision of a basic income grant to address the crisis of unemployment facing South Africa.

The People's budget was preceded by national poverty hearings conducted by the national NGO coalition where communities throughout the country were called upon to provide input on the conditions of poverty and under-development in their communities. It also included follow-up People's Budget hearings where CSOs, especially community-based organisations were asked to give input on what they believed the national budget should prioritise. A similar model of popular budget hearings was later adopted by the Gauteng<sup>90</sup> provincial government.

The Basic Income Grant (BIG) campaign grew out of the People's Budget process. The BIG campaign proposes that a 100 Rand universal grant be provided to all those living in South Africa as a development grant to break the cycle of poverty in which the poor are caught.<sup>91</sup> BIG researchers estimate that the provision of a basic income grant would reduce South Africa's poverty gap by 74%, lifting 6.3 million people above the poverty line. They also demonstrate that the provision of BIG is affordable.<sup>92</sup>

The BIG campaign falls entirely in the MDG framework. However, there has been no reference to the MDGs in any BIG research or campaigning activities. This is largely due to the low levels of awareness about the MDGs among CSOs in Southern Africa, but also due to the gap that exists between CSOs operating at the national level and multilateral institutions such as UNDP, at least in South Africa.

Increased communication about the MDGs with the CSOs active in the BIG campaign can result in the integration of the MDG framework into the BIG campaign and provide a major public awareness drive on the MDGs in South Africa.

#### **4.4.2. CSO Coalitions in PRSP Processes**

Even though some CSOs that participated in PRSP processes in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique are aware of the MDGs, they did not see the MDGs as directly relevant to their interests in the PRSP process. However, while bemoaning the macroeconomic constraints on PRSPs, they all welcomed PRSP decisions that went beyond the constraints of a typical structural adjustment framework, such as ring-fencing of social development expenditure allocations and the provision of free primary education. A Southern African CSO adoption of and focus on the MDGs can provide a useful methodological base from which to ensure upward policy coherence in PRSP processes. It has the potential, if used effectively by CSOs, to reframe PRSP processes.

The same CSOs raise concerns about the monitoring and evaluation of PRSP implementation, for which the MDG framework could be an ideal mechanism.

Similarly, MDG integration can happen with other CSO campaigns both nationally and regionally in Southern Africa. The establishment of the SADC NGO Council at the end of 2002 comprising national NGO coalitions from all SADC countries, for example, provides a unique opportunity for introducing the MDGs to CSOs throughout the region. Other than NEPAD, the SADC NGO Council has been struggling to identify an appropriate common platform that addresses poverty in the region and with which all national NGO coalitions could identify for collaboration.

The need emerges for a targeted communication strategy on the MDGs amongst CSOs in Southern Africa. Linking the MDGs and civil society concerns about current poverty reduction strategies, powerful possibilities exist to integrate the MDGs into existing civil

society campaigns and processes in the region towards more effective partnerships and social delivery.

## **5. Key Findings**

- A combination of food insecurity, extreme concentrations of HIV/AIDS, debt and trade imbalances, and macroeconomic constraints means that progress towards most of the MDGs in Southern Africa is in reverse;
- There are low levels of social trust and confidence in public institutions in the region;
- CSOs in Southern Africa are fragmented according to different understandings of the role and nature of civil society in regard to state transformation towards social development objectives and civil;
- CSO participation in processes intended for more effective poverty reduction policies in the region has helped to mobilise civil society coalitions for poverty reduction but has exposed the limits of a poverty focus within macroeconomic policy constraints;
- NEPAD has contributed to greater regional CSO activity and networking on anti-poverty policy work as a result of its effectiveness in putting African development back on the global political agenda;
- Southern African CSO analysis of NEPAD's goal-driven poverty reduction potential reveals that NEPAD's debt cancellation thinking can provide a positive framework for more effective poverty reduction strategies but that NEPAD faces the same macroeconomic constraints as PRSP processes;
- The MDGs challenge NEPAD in its focus on long-term and indirect poverty reduction strategies rather than people-centred poverty reduction targets;
- A few advanced and some developing CSO forums and campaigns in the region provide entry points to integrating the MDGs into CSO poverty reduction frameworks and to popularising the MDGs in Southern Africa;
- In doing this, CSOs must be attentive to new and serious long-term development policy complications that emerge from an application of the MDG poverty discourse framework within current macroeconomic policy constraints to ensure that macroeconomic policies accord to key goal-driven development needs rather than the other way around.

## **6. Recommendations**

- That more extensive research be conducted in the region on the relationship between a people-centred goal-driven framework such as the MDGs and macroeconomic policy in the region;
- Especially, that a greater focus be placed on the MDGs in the context of NEPAD policy development through an engagement with the NEPAD secretariat;
- That UNDP facilitate the convening of a Southern African CSO MDG network through existing CSO campaigns; and
- That more effective civil society information and communication strategies be undertaken on the MDGs in Southern Africa.

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- <sup>1</sup> Neville Gabriel is the coordinator of the Justice and Peace department of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC). He is also a member of the board of directors of Transparency International (South Africa) and the board of trustees of the African Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD).
- <sup>2</sup> This paper refers to Southern Africa in terms of the 14 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Lesotho, Malawi, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
- <sup>3</sup> Source: African Development Bank (ADB) reported in e-Africa: The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation, South African Institute of International Affairs: June 2003. See [www.saiia.wits.ac.za](http://www.saiia.wits.ac.za)
- <sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive review of how average macro-indicators distort inter-regional, intra-country and sectoral imbalances in relation to progress towards the MDGs, see Jan Vandemoortele, Are the MDGs Feasible in the UNDP Development Policy Journal, Volume 3 April 2003
- <sup>5</sup> The Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Reversals and Challenges, UNDP: May 2003. See [www.undp.org/mdg](http://www.undp.org/mdg)
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid
- <sup>10</sup> Clare Short, letter in response to Action for Southern Africa's campaign on reconstruction in Angola in ACTSA News, Summer 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>11</sup> Maintaining the Momentum: Summary Note of the Regional Consultation on Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Southern Africa, Johannesburg: June 2003. Reacting quickly, the United Nations and its partners have been generally successful in mounting a large-scale emergency response that helped to avert a full-scale disaster and save the lives of millions. The Johannesburg "Maintaining the Momentum" meeting for stakeholders involved with the Southern Africa crisis response was called to review the results of multi-sectoral assessments in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It provided a forum to ensure that a coherent approach is taken by the assistance community at a regional and country level to address emergency needs as well as to support key development objectives. See [www.sahims.net](http://www.sahims.net)
- <sup>12</sup> The Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Reversals and Challenges, UNDP: May 2003. See [www.undp.org/mdg](http://www.undp.org/mdg)
- <sup>13</sup> SADC Annual Report 2000 – 2001. See [www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int)
- <sup>14</sup> 2003 World Development Indicators, World Bank, April 2003. See [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)
- <sup>15</sup> Maintaining the Momentum: Summary Note of the Regional Consultation on Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Southern Africa, Johannesburg: June 2003. See [www.sahims.net](http://www.sahims.net)
- <sup>16</sup> ACTSA News, Summer 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>17</sup> Maintaining the Momentum: Summary Note of the Regional Consultation on Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Southern Africa, Johannesburg: June 2003. See [www.sahims.net](http://www.sahims.net)
- <sup>18</sup> "Vulnerability Analysis – The Southern African Perspective: A joint presentation by 3 members of the SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC)" in Maintaining the Momentum: Summary Note of the Regional Consultation on Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Southern Africa, Johannesburg: June 2003. See [www.sahims.net](http://www.sahims.net)
- <sup>19</sup> 5 per minute campaign 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>20</sup> Renewing Commitment to the Millennium Development Goals: A Call to Action to the Group of Eight, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Press Release: 29 May 2003
- <sup>21</sup> ACTSA News, Summer 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>22</sup> ACTSA News, Summer 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>23</sup> Source: UNAIDS, 2002
- <sup>24</sup> Renewing Commitment to the Millennium Development Goals: A Call to Action to the Group of Eight, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Press Release: 29 May 2003
- <sup>25</sup> Source: Presentation by Pelucy Ntambirweki, Regional Orphans Adviser, UNICEF, May 2003
- <sup>26</sup> UNICEF, cited by SABC Radio News, 27 June 2003
- <sup>27</sup> A continent of orphans, The Economist - Global Agenda: 27 November 2002
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid
- <sup>29</sup> "HIV infection increases a person's protein and energy requirements. However, HIV/AIDS can simultaneously lead to a reduction in the quantity of food a person is able to consume, which often leads to protein energy malnutrition. Reduced food intake can be the result of either clinical (physical or psychological) symptoms or deteriorating economic conditions within the household that make providing consistent food difficult. The presence of HIV/AIDS also leads to mal-absorption of important micronutrients that are important for proper immune functioning. Metabolic changes resulting from decreased intake of food and the immune's response to the virus can further accelerate wasting and weight loss as the body begins to break down body protein. Likewise, a compromised nutritional status can accelerate the progression of HIV to AIDS, while quality nutrition can prolong this period and lead to a greater quality of life. Poor nutritional status also increases the risk of HIV transmission from mother to child." Matt Hanley, Food Security, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS: Review of the literature and Catholic Relief Services' experience, Unpublished paper: March 2003
- <sup>30</sup> Matt Hanley, Food Security, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS: Review of the literature and Catholic Relief Services' experience, Unpublished paper: March 2003
- <sup>31</sup> Using an Asset based framework of Rural Livelihoods to Reduce Poverty in Tanzania; Carmela Abate et. al, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Tanzania, 2003
- <sup>32</sup> Matt Hanley, Food Security, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS: Review of the literature and Catholic Relief Services' experience, Unpublished paper: March 2003
- <sup>33</sup> 5 per minute campaign 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>34</sup> A continent of orphans, The Economist - Global Agenda: 27 November 2002
- <sup>35</sup> Hitting Home: How Households Cope with the Impact of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic – A Survey of Households Affected by HIV/AIDS in South Africa, Health Systems Trust and Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, October 2002. See [www.hst.org.za](http://www.hst.org.za)
- <sup>36</sup> Stephen Lewis, address to G6B Civil Society Summit in Calgary, 22 June 2002
- <sup>37</sup> The Challenge of HIV/AIDS for Food Security and Nutrition; Tony Barnett, School of Development Studies, UEA, Norwich, UK, 2002. See <http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/publink/barnett/asb02e.shtml>
- <sup>38</sup> Matt Hanley, Food Security, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS: Review of the literature and Catholic Relief Services' experience, Unpublished paper: March 2003
- <sup>39</sup> ACTSA News, Summer 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)
- <sup>40</sup> Source: unpublished research by Aditi Sharma, Action for Southern Africa.



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<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> 2003 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 13 April 2003. See [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>43</sup> Of the fourteen countries that are part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Angola, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are recognised as HIPC. However, it should be noted that the IMF/World Bank's debt sustainability analysis in 2000 indicated that Angola has a "sustainable" debt without help from the HIPC debt relief initiative. 34 out of the 41 HIPC countries recognised by the IMF and World Bank are in Africa, 4 in Latin America, and 3 in Asia.

<sup>44</sup> Calculated from data in SADC Annual Report 2000 – 2001. See [www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int)

<sup>45</sup> Paying Twice for Apartheid: Southern Africa's Apartheid-Caused Debt, Joe Hanlon, 1996

<sup>46</sup> In addition to the apartheid-caused nature of Southern Africa's debt (research in Zambia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe shows that about 80% of Southern Africa's debt can be directly attributed to the struggle against apartheid), Carol Lancaster, a former deputy director of the US Agency for International Development, points out that of the \$22 billion provided in aid to Sub-Saharan Africa by the US between 1957 and 1995, \$5 billion went to the Zaire under Mobutu, Somalia under Siad Barre, Sudan under Numeiry, and Liberia, mostly under Doe. That aid was lost. But the US was not alone. There were problems with Swedish aid in Tanzania, Belgian aid in Zaire, Italian aid in Somalia, and many other examples. See Africa Recovery, Vol. 13, no. 2-3, September 1999. [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

<sup>47</sup> Jubilee South Africa, Media Release in response to G8 debt relief announcement, Kananaskis, 26 June 2002

<sup>48</sup> 5 per minute campaign 2003. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)

<sup>49</sup> Kairos Canada reports in an unpublished paper that Africa exports nearly 30% more today than it did in 1980 but the prices it receives for these exports have fallen by 40% over the same period. Africa therefore produces more for external markets but receives less income for it.

<sup>50</sup> Zambia's Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace, for example, ran a five-year national popular-based research programme that monitored the impact of structural adjustment policies on unemployment levels, food security, household income levels, education, and health care.

<sup>51</sup> Africa's Experience with the PRSP Content and Process: Synthesis Report of Ten African Countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, AFRODAD PRSP Series, July 2003

<sup>52</sup> Cited in Debt Cancellation: Moral Hazard or Moral Imperative, Neville Gabriel, July 2002

<sup>53</sup> The Development Report 2003 of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) will, for example, focus on the theme 'Financing Africa's Development: Enhancing the role of private finance'. The report will argue for greater attention to private capital flows for Southern Africa's development within the framework of NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals, on the hypothesis that increased private finance will stimulate development and that the impact of private finance is constrained by socio-economic and governance risks in the region. See [www.dbsa.org](http://www.dbsa.org)

<sup>54</sup> Sources: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank, and unpublished paper by Kairos Canada

<sup>55</sup> Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank. See [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>56</sup> Source: Martin Creamer's Engineering News, 24 – 30 January 2003. At June 2003 ZAR/USD exchange rates.

<sup>57</sup> South African Business in Africa: An Introductory Survey and Analysis, Dianna Games, South African Institute of International Affairs, June 2003. This report is a study of the experience of doing business in the rest of Africa of a number of South African companies. It looks at four sectors (banking, telecommunications, retail and food, and mining) and four countries (Morocco, Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda). See [www.saaia.wits.ac.za](http://www.saaia.wits.ac.za)

<sup>58</sup> Afrobarometer Paper no. 8, Views of Democracy in South Africa and the Region: Trends and Comparisons, Robert Mattes, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa, October 2000. See [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)

<sup>59</sup> Political Violence Report, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 17 June 2003. The Forum is constituted of the following core member organisations: Amani Trust, Amnesty International (Zimbabwe), Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), Transparency International (Zimbabwe), University of Zimbabwe Legal Aid and Advice Scheme, Zimbabwe Association for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of the Offender, Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR), Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), and Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA).

<sup>60</sup> Afrobarometer Paper no. 8, Views of Democracy in South Africa and the Region: Trends and Comparisons, Robert Mattes, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa, October 2000. See [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)

<sup>61</sup> Alastair Fraser, Failings of Poor Relief. See [www.actsa.org](http://www.actsa.org)

<sup>62</sup> Mainstreaming Development in Trade and Finance: A Key to Global Partnership, Martin Khor, UNDP Development Policy Journal, Volume 3, April 2003

<sup>63</sup> Ibid

<sup>64</sup> See: Southern African Scenarios 2015: Renaissance, Asymmetry, or Decline and Decay – A Guide for Decision-Makers in the SADC Region, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

<sup>65</sup> cf Africa's Experience with the PRSP Content and Process: Synthesis Report of Ten African Countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, AFRODAD PRSP Series 2003, June 2003. See [www.afrodad.org](http://www.afrodad.org)

<sup>66</sup> Ibid

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> Rodrigues Island, 560km North-East of the island of Mauritius, is the tenth administrative district of Mauritius.

<sup>72</sup> cf Africa's Experience with the PRSP Content and Process: Synthesis Report of Ten African Countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, AFRODAD PRSP Series 2003, June 2003. See [www.afrodad.org](http://www.afrodad.org)

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

<sup>74</sup> During the last EU-SADC Summit in Maputo, for example, two Southern African government delegations opposed the presentation of the declaration of the civil society parallel meeting to the plenary session of the official summit.

<sup>75</sup> The Washington Consensus refers to the convergence of socio-economic development thinking between the Washington-based international financial institutions in regard to the austere macro-economic development policies that have been associated with the process of globalisation.

<sup>76</sup> The Monterrey Consensus maintains the Washington Consensus focus on trade and foreign direct investment (i.e. private investment) as the engines of growth to overcome poverty.

<sup>77</sup> South African President Thabo Mbeki's address to the plenary session in Monterrey was instructive about the ongoing process in which Monterrey is regarded as a turning point. The Millennium Summit set the goals by declaring millennium development targets,

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Monterrey provided the framework in which those goals would be achieved, and the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development would fill out the content of an action plan, he said. But South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel made the significant point in a side event that the Johannesburg Summit should have preceded the Monterrey Conference if financing mechanisms were to conform to development needs rather than the other way around. In other words, now that the economic framework has been set in the Monterrey Consensus, political considerations and development needs raised in Johannesburg would have to be limited accordingly. Nonetheless, Mbeki declared that "we must accept the Monterrey Consensus".

<sup>78</sup> NEPAD and the Challenge of Africa's Development: Towards the Political Economy of a Discourse, Jimi Adesina: 2003

<sup>79</sup> For a comprehensive treatment of interpretations of civil society, see NEPAD and the Challenge of Africa's Development: Towards the political economy of a discourse, Jimi Adesina, Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, 2003

<sup>80</sup> The South African Council of Churches, for example, hosted an all-Africa church consultation on NEPAD in Johannesburg, 23-26 March 2003. Civil society organisations in South Africa also convened a consultation on 'The Role of Civil Society in the African Union and NEPAD: Strategies for Civil Society's Involvement in National Debates and Processes', in Cape Town 19 – 20 June, for example, bringing together major civil society organisations to discuss a strategy for more effective CSO participation in the NEPAD process. For a report on this meeting see [www.idasa.org](http://www.idasa.org)

<sup>81</sup> The bulk of this analysis of NEPAD's ability to achieve clearly defined social development targets is contained in Un-blurring the Vision: An Assessment of NEPAD by South African Churches, South African Council of Churches and SACBC Justice & Peace Department: 2002. See [www.sacc.org.za](http://www.sacc.org.za)

<sup>82</sup> Public criticism of NEPAD was given by both the governments of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

<sup>83</sup> For a critical annotated commentary on NEPAD's economic model by Prof Patrick Bond and NGO statements rejecting NEPAD's economic plan see [www.aidc.org.za](http://www.aidc.org.za)

<sup>84</sup> Based on unpublished comments by Walden Bello, Executive Director, Focus on the Global South.

<sup>85</sup> Ravi Kanbur, for example, argued this point in his preliminary analysis of NEPAD. For the text of a paper he presented on this topic and other useful Southern African resources on NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals, visit the website of the Southern African Regional Poverty Network – [www.sarpn.org.za](http://www.sarpn.org.za)

<sup>86</sup> See, for example, A Participatory Approach to Partnerships for Africa's Development, Henry Northover, CAFOD, May 2002. See [www.cafod.org.uk](http://www.cafod.org.uk)

<sup>87</sup> Why shouldn't Tanzania have air traffic control?, John Pender, Spiked Online, 21 December 2001. See [www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000002D377.htm](http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000002D377.htm); and From "Structural Adjustment" to "Comprehensive Development Framework": conditionality transformed? John Pender, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22 no. 3 2001

<sup>88</sup> The Southern African Human Rights Trust (SAHRIT), for example, does extensive work to monitor Southern African countries' reporting in terms of AU human rights instruments and conducts a highly regarded annual training programme that includes extensive components on social and economic rights.

<sup>89</sup> The Trade Strategy Group (TSG), for example, including the regional Economic Justice Network (EJN), has closely followed regional trade issues in relation to the WTO, the EU, and the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. In addition, Southern African CSOs will participate in the launch of a global trade justice movement to be held in New Delhi, India, in November 2003. Previous MDG strategy reflections organised by UNDP have proposed that the CSO trade justice movement can serve as a useful vehicle for CSO mobilisation on the MDGs.

<sup>90</sup> Gauteng is the most populated province of South Africa, including Johannesburg and Pretoria.

<sup>91</sup> For a comprehensive treatment of the developmental nature of the BIG proposal, see [www.epri.org.za](http://www.epri.org.za), the website of the Economic Policy Research Institute.

<sup>92</sup> Research Review in Social Security Reform and the Basic Income Grant for South Africa, Commissioned by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Economic Policy Research Institute, 21 January 2002