Executive summary
For all the sound and fury of international
condemnation and domestic opposition,
octogenarian President Robert Mugabe maintains
the upper hand in Zimbabwe. He has bludgeoned
opposition parties and neutralised mass action
strategies, minimised African criticism, maintained
South Africa's friendship, and withstood sporadic
pressure from the wider international community. It
has been a masterful performance. It is also one that
has done massive damage to Zimbabwe's economy,
which is shrinking at world record speed. It is time
to acknowledge the collective failure to date, re-
evaluate strategies for resolving the crisis, and
concentrate on the opportunity presented by the
March 2005 parliamentary elections.
Though it retains some of the trappings of a multi-
party democracy, Zimbabwe is de facto a one-party
state controlled by a narrow group of ZANU-PF
and military officials who have used its resources
and institutions for personal enrichment. The ruling
party gives its key supporters in the security
services, the army and a large patronage network a
piece of the action to ensure their commitment to
the status quo. So little is left for social
requirements that Zimbabwe, which exported food
until recently, has the highest percentage in Africa
of people being fed by international aid.
Preoccupied as it is with looting the state and with
the politics of presidential succession, it is almost
inconceivable that ZANU-PF would now negotiate
seriously with the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). Its strategy appears to
be to delay any formal process, while South
African President Thabo Mbeki talks about talks.
Meanwhile, the regime has become more proficient
at forestalling resistance to its rule. Demonstrations
are usually thwarted before they begin or broken up
early. Youth militias terrorise opposition supporters. Detain-and-release cycles are applied to
opposition and civic leaders, combined with
endless court actions to wear down stamina and
resources. At the core is violence, used in both
targeted and indiscriminate ways.
There are two possibilities for the parliamentary
elections that the government has indicated will be
held in less than a year's time. One is that a
negotiated inter-party settlement or greatly
intensified international pressure -- or both -- will
produce the conditions for a free and fair electoral
process; the other is that the ruling party will
continue to stall on talks, rig the electoral process,
increase state violence, and win a non-credible
vote. If the latter happens, Zimbabwe will probably
be at the point of no return. Elements of the
opposition and civil society, disaffected war
veterans and youth militia, and losers in the ZANU-
PF factional battle might well fight one another or
the state. Democracy promotion in Zimbabwe
today is a conflict prevention strategy.
The response to Zimbabwe's tragedy has been
inadequate and ineffectual at all levels. The U.S.
and EU feed the majority of Zimbabweans, but
their policies do not begin to address the roots of
the crisis. South Africa and other neighbours have
not made the kind of concerted effort to resolve the
crisis that states in East Africa and West Africa
have attempted when confronted with their own
regional problems. On the contrary, their policies
have amounted to covering for the regime. The
opposition and civil society have made shows of
good faith by participating in governing institutions
and electoral processes, but that has only given a
veneer of legitimacy to a system that is suppressing
political freedom and destroying what had been one
of Africa's more dynamic economies. All these
actors need to change course.
The March 2005 elections are the vital target. Since
a broad ZANU-PF/MDC agreement on the
country's problems now seems unattainable, the
focus of international engagement should be on
crafting specific benchmarks and timelines for a
free and fair electoral process. The U.S., EU and
UN should work closely with each other, the
Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the African Union (AU), and the
Commonwealth and consult with key stakeholders
in Zimbabwe to craft these benchmarks and
accompanying timelines. The benchmarks should
be based on the SADC Norms and Standards for
Free and Fair Elections. There should be an agreed
procedure for determining quickly whether the
process -- not the voting day itself -- is conducted
properly, and to the greatest extent possible
agreement on the specific consequences that would
flow from violations. The EU and U.S. should start
the urgent task of building consensus around this
plan of action by appointing envoys to consult
throughout the region.
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